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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES 
 
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), amici curiae certify as follows. 
(A) Parties and Amici. All parties and amici appearing in this Court are listed in 
the Briefs for Appellants and Appellees. 
(B) Rulings Under Review. References to the rulings at issue appear in the 
Certificate filed April 6, 2017.   
(C) Related Cases. To the knowledge of counsel, other than any cases listed in 
the Certificate filed April 6, 2017, the case on review was not previously 
before this Court or any other court, and there are no other related cases 
currently pending in this Court or in any other court. 
 
/s/  
 Counsel for Amici Curiae  
  
USCA Case #17-7035      Document #1694527            Filed: 09/25/2017      Page 3 of 25
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... iv	
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. v	
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................... 1	
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ..................................................................... 1	
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY, INTEREST IN CASE, AND SOURCE OF 
AUTHORITY TO FILE ...................................................................................... 1	
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS ... 2	
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................................................................. 4	
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 5	
I.	 ASTM’s Claims are Barred Under Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox ................................ 5	
II.	 ASTM’s Claims are also Barred Under Rogers v. Grimaldi ............................................ 11	
III.	 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 15	
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 16	
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................. 17	
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................... 18	
 
  
USCA Case #17-7035      Document #1694527            Filed: 09/25/2017      Page 4 of 25
 v 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Cases 
Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)  …………………………………………………………..…..10 
Bretford Manufacturing, Inc. v. Smith System Manufacturing Corp., 419 F.3d 576 
(7th Cir. 2005) …………………………………………………………………6, 8 
Brown v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) …………………………..14-15 
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 
1989) ……………………………………………………………………………12 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000) …….15 
Cyber Websmith, Inc. v. American Dental Association, 2010 WL 3075726, No. 09-
CV-6198 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 4, 2010)  …………………………………………...10 
*Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) …….2, 4-9, 13 
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) 
……………………………………………………………………..……….12 
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) …………..………..12 
Ho v. Taflove, 696 F. Supp. 2d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 
2011)………...…………………………………………………………………. 15 
Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d. 881 (E.D. Mich. 2014)…………...….. 8 
Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) …………………...…13 
N.A.A.C.P. v. Radiance Foundation, Inc., 786 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2015) ….....12, 15 
New Kids On The Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) 
…………………………………………………………………………..….13 
Phx. Entm’t Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2016) ……...6, 8, 9, 10-11 
Pulse Entertainment Corp. v. David, No. CV 14-4732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) 8 
*Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) ……………………...1, 5, 10-12 
Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ Servs., LLC, 
No. 14-17229 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2017) (per curiam) ……………………..………6 
USCA Case #17-7035      Document #1694527            Filed: 09/25/2017      Page 5 of 25
 vi 
Smith v. BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-04374, 2014 BL 263099 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) …….………………………………………………10 
U.S. Olympic Committee v. American Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Colo. 
2001) ………………………………………………...………………………….13 
University of Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266 (11th 
Cir. 2012) …………………………………………………………………...11, 12 
Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003) …...…7 
 
Statutes 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) …………………………………………………5 
 
Other Authorities 
William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267 
(2010)  …………..………………………………………………………………13 
Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1425 (2017) ……………….……………………………………8-9 
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, The Adventure of the Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 561, 606 (2015). ………………………………….……………. 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks. 
  
USCA Case #17-7035      Document #1694527            Filed: 09/25/2017      Page 6 of 25
 vii 
 
USCA Case #17-7035      Document #1694527            Filed: 09/25/2017      Page 7 of 25
 1 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 
 
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
All applicable statutes, etc., are contained in the Brief for Appellants and 
Appellees.  
 
STATEMENT OF IDENTITY, INTEREST IN CASE, AND SOURCE OF 
AUTHORITY TO FILE 
 
(A) Statement of Identity. Amici, listed below, are law professors who teach and 
have written extensively about trademark law.1  
Stacey Dogan, Boston University School of Law 
Jessica Litman, University of Michigan Law School 
Mark P. McKenna, Notre Dame Law School 
Betsy Rosenblatt, Whittier Law School 
Elizabeth I. Winston, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law   
Rebecca Tushnet, Harvard Law School 
 
(B) Interest in Case. Our sole interest in this case is in the development of 
trademark law in a way that serves the public interest.  We do not, in general, 
agree with the district court’s copyright ruling, but we are especially 
                                                
1 Amici sign this brief in their individual capacities. Institutions are listed for 
identification purposes only.  
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concerned with that court’s misapplication of key trademark doctrines.  
Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Rogers 
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), both mandate that trademark claims 
cannot be based upon the idea that the content of the defendant’s expressive 
goods or services implies authorization from the creator of that content.  The 
district court’s trademark reasoning ignores the statutory and First 
Amendment concerns that should exclude Public Resource’s conduct from the 
scope of trademark law and place it within copyright law, no matter what the 
proper resolution of the copyright claims is. 
(C) Authority to File. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), all 
parties received appropriate notice of and consented to the filing of this brief. 
A separate brief is warranted pursuant to Circuit Rule 29(d). The District 
Court’s ruling has implications far beyond this particular case, as it threatens 
to undermine critical limitations on the scope of trademark law and to put 
trademark law into conflict with copyright law and the First Amendment. 
 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP AND FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
No party’s counsel authored this Amici Curiae brief in whole or in part. No 
party or party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or 
submitting this brief; and No person, other than the Amici Curiae or their counsel 
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. All 
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signatories speak only on behalf of themselves. Institutional affiliations are listed 
for identification purposes only.  
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
ASTM’s fundamental complaint is about unauthorized use of its intangible 
content—the standards for which it claims copyright ownership. Dastar 
unambiguously holds, however, that only confusion regarding the source of physical 
goods is actionable under the Lanham Act; confusion regarding the authorship of the 
standards or their authorization is not actionable. ASTM cannot avoid Dastar just 
because Public Resource creates digital copies of those standards. Consumers 
encounter the ASTM marks only as part of the standards, into which ATSM chose 
to embed the marks. As a result, any “confusion” could only be the result of the 
content itself. Dastar teaches that control over the creative work is the province of 
copyright law, not the Lanham Act.  Accepting ASTM’s argument would create 
exactly the kind of “mutant copyright” rejected by the Supreme Court. 
Along with Dastar, trademark law contains additional limiting doctrines to avoid 
this problem when it comes from allegedly implied endorsement based upon the 
content of a work.  Under Rogers v. Grimaldi, where the allegedly infringing use 
comes from the content of a work—including its title—infringement liability is 
limited to cases of affirmative misrepresentations about authorization (or uses 
unrelated to the content, not argued here), and does not extend to any implication of 
authorization that might come from the mere presence of a mark as part of a work.  
Rogers ensures that Dastar’s mandate cannot be evaded by making arguments about 
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 5 
the “quality” of the defendant’s copies, as ASTM did here.  Together, Dastar and 
Rogers set out a clear rule that defines the boundaries of copyright and trademark 
law. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. ASTM’s Claims are Barred Under Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Dastar copied footage from the Crusade in Europe television series originally 
released by Twentieth Century Fox’s predecessor in interest and re-used that footage 
in its own video series without attribution to Fox. According to Fox, this constituted 
reverse passing off. Dastar, Fox claimed, was passing off Fox’s content as though it 
were Dastar’s own, thereby falsely designating the origin of the video series in 
violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27.  That section of the 
statute makes actionable  
use of any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, 
or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or 
false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, 
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial 
activities by another person.  
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).  
According to the Supreme Court, as used in the statute, “origin of goods” 
refers only to “the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not 
to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” 
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Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. Indeed, “origin of goods” is “incapable of connoting the 
person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody or 
contain.” Id. at 32.  
Under Dastar, only misrepresentations of the origin of physical goods are 
actionable under § 43(a).  Other sorts of misrepresentations, including but not limited 
to misrepresentations of the origin of creative content, are not actionable. Phx. 
Entm’t Partners v. Rumsey, 829 F.3d 817, 828 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Even as to 
[communicative goods like documentary videotapes and karaoke tracks], the Court 
made clear that the “good” whose “origin” is material for purposes of a trademark 
infringement claim is the “tangible product sold in the marketplace” rather than the 
creative content of that product.”).  Dastar thus precludes claims that use of the 
plaintiff’s mark suggests that the plaintiff created or authorized a particular physical 
(or digital) copy, if the evidence of misrepresentation is based solely on the content 
of the copy.  See Slep-Tone Entertainment Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ 
Servs., LLC, No. 14-17229 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2017) (per curiam) (alleged confusion 
caused by the content of copyrighted music files was not actionable under Dastar); 
Phx. Entm’t, 829 F.3d 817, 828 (same).2  
                                                
2 Because the Dastar rule derives from a construction of the text of the Lanham 
Act, it does not depend on the copyright status of the plaintiff’s work—it applies 
with respect to works currently within copyright as well as uncopyrightable works. 
See Bretford Manufacturing, Inc. v. Smith System Manufacturing Corp., 419 F.3d 
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ASTM cannot avoid that result just because it chose to embed its marks in its 
content. Indeed, the Supreme Court anticipated—and rejected—precisely the 
argument ASTM urged here. The Court noted that if “Dastar had simply copied the 
television series as Crusade in Europe and sold it as Crusade in Europe, without 
changing the title or packaging (including the original credits to Fox),” Fox still 
would not have been satisfied and likely would have brought a passing off claim. 
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36. That claim, of course, would have been the same one ASTM 
made here: it would have alleged confusion based on the credits identifying the 
original creators, just as ASTM alleges confusion based on the inclusion of the 
ASTM marks within the content. Far from endorsing such a claim, the Court invoked 
this hypothetical claim to demonstrate why “origin” must be understood to refer only 
to the origin of tangible goods. Id.  As the full context of the Court’s discussion 
makes clear, its interpretation of “origin” ruled out not only claims for failing to 
credit the creator of a work, but also claims based simply on crediting the creator, 
“if that [crediting] should be regarded as implying the creator’s ‘sponsorship or 
approval’ of the copy.” Id. (emphasis added). 
If it were otherwise, Disney could prevent others from selling copies of 
Steamboat Willie even after its copyright expired by arguing that, because Mickey 
                                                
576 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 
1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
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Mouse is in the movie and is Disney’s trademark, consumers will be confused about 
the source of physical copies of the movie. Under ASTM’s interpretation, that claim 
would technically survive Dastar because it is nominally focused on the source of 
physical goods, even though in truth it hinges on an assertion that consumers will 
think Disney authorized the reproduction of the content. Dastar would be a dead 
letter, since it would allow any plaintiff to plead around the holding, creating 
precisely the sort of “mutant copyright law” the Supreme Court rejected. Id. at 34; 
cf. Bretford, 419 F.3d 580–81 (noting that consumers might see marks embedded in 
other products, and holding that Dastar bars claims based solely on that embedding). 
Post-Dastar decisions have routinely held that, if the plaintiff’s only claim of 
confusion comes from the reproduction of the expressive content of a work that 
includes trademarks, then Dastar ought to apply, because origin cannot be inferred 
from the content alone. In Phoenix, for example, the Seventh Circuit rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim that consumers were likely to be confused about the origin of 
unauthorized karaoke tracks in which the plaintiff’s mark was embedded. Phoenix 
Entm’t, 829 F.3d at 829 (“That the Sound Choice mark is embedded in the creative 
content of the karaoke track and is visible to the public whenever the track is played 
does not falsely suggest that Slep–Tone is endorsing the performance …”); see also  
Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1425, 1451 (2017) (“Tangibility dictates that the proper inquiry must 
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be whether consumers are likely to be confused about the source of some tangible 
good sold by the defendant, not the good depicted within the creative content. … 
And any confusion about the source of the digital file would have to be traceable to 
something other than the content of that file …”). 
It is, of course, likely that consumers listening to copies of music files will 
correctly attribute the plaintiff’s creative content to the plaintiff, but as the Seventh 
Circuit explained, that is true regardless of whether the copies are authorized or not; 
“all that distinguishes the legitimate copy from the illegitimate copy is authorization 
to make the copy—and that sounds much more like a claim of copyright 
infringement than a claim of trademark infringement.” Phoenix Entm’t, 829 F.3d at 
at 825.  Because there is no reason to believe that consumers know or care about the 
details of the physical substrate, other confusion theories are precluded under 
Dastar.  Id. at 829 (“And because patrons see only the creative content of the tracks 
rather than the particular medium from which the tracks are played, there is no reason 
to think that they believe that the digital file, wherever it resides, was itself produced 
or approved by Slep–Tone.”).3  See also Pulse Entertainment Corp. v. David, No. 
CV 14-4732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2014) (Dastar barred false designation of origin 
claim based on misattribution of hologram to wrong creator; hologram was creative 
                                                
3 Proper labeling of the source, at most, is all that is required to avoid confusion.  
Public Resource’s website is clearly labeled as such, rather than as an ASTM 
website. 
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work like a cartoon); Masck v. Sports Illustrated, 5 F. Supp. 3d. 881 (E.D. Mich. 
2014) (Dastar barred false designation of origin claim based on copying of photos); 
Smith v. BarnesandNoble.com, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-04374, 2014 BL 263099 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2014) (Dastar barred claims of false representation of affiliation 
between an author and a distributor based merely on sale of copies of author’s book, 
even if the distributor was distributing unauthorized copies); Antidote Int’l Films, 
Inc. v. Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Dastar 
barred false affiliation claim where “one person is the publisher of a novel and the 
other is the author of the novel, because the holding of Dastar would be meaningless 
if a false authorship claim could’ be recast in this manner”); see also Cyber 
Websmith, Inc. v. American Dental Association, 2010 WL 3075726, No. 09-CV-
6198 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 4, 2010) (holding that “the inherent misrepresentation that 
accompanies the unauthorized copying and distribution of another’s copyrighted 
work” is not enough to create a Lanham Act cause of action separate from 
copyright). 
Phoenix is also instructive because it rejected the “inferior copies” theory 
ASTM advanced before the district court.  As the Seventh Circuit explained, the 
problem with that theory is that, even if true, the inferior quality of copies is 
irrelevant if the defendant is not providing consumers tangible goods in the 
marketplace. Phx. Emtm’t, 829 F.3d at 831 (“Whatever wrong the defendants may 
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have committed by making (or causing to be made) unauthorized copies of Slep–
Tone's tracks, they are not alleged to have held out a tangible good sold in the 
marketplace as a Slep–Tone product. Consequently, the defendants' alleged conduct 
is not actionable as trademark infringement.”) (emphasis added). The Phoenix 
court’s reasoning applies here, where, in technical terms, the physical copy any 
individual consumer perceives is made on her own computer.  The fact that it is sent 
from a Public Resource computer does not change the basic problem that ASTM’s 
real objection is to copying of its content, not to any implied misrepresentation about 
the origin or endorsement of the physical arrangement of ones and zeros or electronic 
impulses.  
II. ASTM’s Claims are also Barred Under Rogers v. Grimaldi 
As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, Rogers is “the landmark case for 
balancing trademark and First Amendment rights.” University of Alabama Bd. of 
Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012).  In Rogers, the 
defendant created a film about two fictional Italian dancers who were called “Ginger 
and Fred,” which was the film’s title. Ginger Rogers, a famous dancer who often 
worked with Fred Astaire, sued under § 43(a), arguing that the film’s title falsely 
implied that she was endorsing or featured in the film, Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997, just 
as ASTM argues that the presence of its trademarks as part of its standards implies 
that it endorses the copies on PR’s website. 
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The Second Circuit made clear that, while purchasers have a right to avoid 
deception, where the “product” at issue is itself expressive, the Lanham Act should 
be read narrowly to avoid impinging on speech protected by the First Amendment: 
We believe that in general the Act should be construed to apply to artistic 
works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion 
outweighs the public interest in free expression. In the context of allegedly 
misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that balance will normally not 
support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever, or if it has some artistic relevance, unless the 
title explicitly misleads as to the source of the work.  
 
Id. at 999. “The canon of constitutional avoidance in this area is thus not a device of 
judicial evasion but an effort to reconcile the commercial values protected by the 
Lanham Act and the democratic value of expressive freedom.” N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Radiance Foundation, Inc., 786 F.3d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2015). 
Rogers addresses the First Amendment concerns that would arise were 
trademark law to allow infringement claims based on implications of affiliation or 
sponsorship due only to use of a trademark as part of the content of expressive works 
that are the goods being sold (or are the services being rendered).  The rule of 
Rogers, which has been followed by numerous courts,4 protects consumers against 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trustees, 683 F.3d at 1278; E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n. 11 (6th Cir. 2003); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989) (the 
Rogers test is “generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic 
expression”). 
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material deception without creating a chilling effect for producers of expressive 
works.5  Rogers usually applies where the trademark owner is the subject of the 
content, but its speech-protective rationale is at least as applicable where the 
trademark owner initially created the content, and thus the basic identification of the 
trademark owner is truthful (albeit allegedly misleading by implication).  In such 
situations, Rogers works consistently with Dastar.6  See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, 
The Adventure of the Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 606 
(2015).  Rogers is thus another route to prevent the creation of a “mutant copyright 
law,” by preventing a copyright owner from asserting trademark rights to prevent 
copying independent of copyright law. 
                                                
5 Although many works protected by Rogers are traditional artistic works, the same 
principles apply to political and other non-advertising speech, which equally 
receives full First Amendment protection.  See, e.g., U.S. Olympic Committee v. 
American Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (D. Colo. 2001) (applying 
Rogers to nonfiction magazine); cf. Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 906 
(9th Cir. 2002) (“If speech is not purely commercial—that is, if it does more than 
propose a commercial transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”) (in the context of applying Rogers). 
6 Indeed, the use here would satisfy the more stringent standard rejected by Rogers, 
that of necessity, because the standards cannot be identified without reference to 
ASTM. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998. The same rationale could be offered under the 
heading of “nominative fair use.”  See New Kids On The Block v. News America 
Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining nominative fair use), aff’g 745 
F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (using Rogers to protect news publications); 
see also William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 2267 (2010) (explaining substantial overlap between doctrines). Amici 
suggest that Rogers is a simpler test in the instant case because it offers a rule for 
non-advertising expression generally, while nominative fair use can apply to 
advertising uses as well.  
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Indeed, Rogers confirms that the correct way to read Dastar is to prevent 
parties from evading the holding by referring to irrelevant tangible goods.  Courts in 
Rogers cases have for decades been barring claims because the allegedly infringing 
use was part of the defendant’s content, implicitly refusing to let parties 
disingenuously claim that confusion related to the tangible copies provided by the 
defendant rather than the intangible content.  When a defendant uses another’s 
trademark as part of a work, whether in the title or the content, claims based on 
allegedly implied endorsement are barred absent an explicit misrepresentation of 
sponsorship, endorsement, or origin.  Thus, the distinction that ASTM used to avoid 
Dastar—a claim that the alleged confusion is based not on the origin of the content 
of the standards, but on the implied endorsement of the specific copies of the 
standards on PR’s website—is invalid.7 
“It is well established that the use of a mark alone is not enough to satisfy [the 
explicit misleadingness] prong of the Rogers test.” Brown v. Elec. Arts, 724 F.3d 
1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013).  If use of a mark alone were sufficient, “it would render 
Rogers a nullity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elec. Arts, 724 
                                                
7 Likewise, when Steamboat Willie enters the public domain, as it will shortly do, 
Disney should not be able to prevent others from making copies available by 
alleging, as ASTM did, that the copies at issue are bad ones and that the presence 
of its trademark (Mickey Mouse) in the copies and descriptions thereof implies 
Disney’s endorsement.  There is no difference between Disney’s hypothetical end-
run around copyright law and ASTM’s here. 
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F.3d at 1246, 1248 (“To be relevant [under Rogers], evidence must relate to the 
nature of the behavior of the identifying material’s user, not the impact of the use. 
Even if Brown could offer a survey demonstrating that consumers of the Madden 
NFL series believed that Brown endorsed the game, that would not support the claim 
that the use was explicitly misleading to consumers…. Brown would need to 
demonstrate that EA explicitly misled consumers as to his involvement.”).  Public 
Resource made no explicit claims of authorization, affiliation, or sponsorship.  Cf. 
Radiance Found, 786 F.3d at 324  (explaining that Lanham Act’s “in connection 
with” requirement demands a nexus between the use and a commercial transaction, 
not just the presence of a mark); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 
F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Comedy III”s argument that “the [video] 
clip at issue falls under the protection of the Lanham Act because it contains 
elements that in other contexts might serve as trademarks”); Ho v. Taflove, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (holding that communicative use for expressive 
purposes is not the kind of use trademark law targets), aff’d, 648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 
2011).  
III. Conclusion 
The appropriate scope of ASTM’s rights in copies of its standards is 
determined by copyright law, not trademark law.  It is there, if at all, that any remedy 
lies for Public Resource’s copying. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed. 
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